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DRAFT—NOT FOR QUOTATION OR CITATION.
Aristotelian Phronêsis, the Discourse of Human Rights, and Contemporary Global Practice
Stephen Salkever
Bryn Mawr College
August, 2013
(A version of this paper was presented at a conference on Practical Wisdom and Globalizing Practice held in
November 2012 at Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China. For questions and comments I thank my fellow
conferees and especially the conference organizer, Prof. Xu Changfu of the SYSU Philosophy Department.)

In this paper, I will outline some fundamental differences between the evaluative and
explanatory language of Aristotelian practical reason based on his empirical psychological
theory of individual human development, on the one hand, and the 20th and 21st century
discourse of human rights based on a transcendent principle of universal human dignity on the
other. To what extent are these two types of political discourse compatible in today's globalizing
world? To the extent that they are not compatible, which should be preferred? My answer is that
they are compatible but only if the Aristotelian framework is treated as more fundamental, and
the rights-and-dignity perspective is understood as a potentially good political solution, for the
time being, in the contemporary context of global politics.
Since the adoption of the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 the
belief that a commitment to human rights should be the core of everyone’s (and every culture’s)
normative perspective on world politics has become very widespread and is by now embedded in
a wide variety of international and regional institutions and treaties. And yet even as the
influence of the idea of universal human rights has spread across the globe, at the same time the
attempt to articulate a non-religious or non-sectarian philosophical justification for the doctrine
of universal human rights, usually involving an assertion of equal “dignity” as a characteristic of
all human beings, has not been as successful. Some critics have argued that this failure to
persuasively justify the international human rights “regime” suggests that the global politics of
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human rights is simply an assertion of provincial Western norms.1 I will argue that the
contemporary articulations of human rights indeed rest on a neo-Kantian (and hence postChristian) Western (and hence modern2) philosophical foundation.3 As a result, I argue that it

1

The post-1948 human rights regime was understood by its founders as a bulwark against totalitarian or
other forms of injustice, and some now see it as, potentially, an obstacle to the hegemony of global
capital. For a philosophically and politically informed account of the controversies surrounding the
meaning of the UDHR from the time of its writing to the present, see Glendon 2001. On the other hand,
critics of the human rights regime worry that it is an ideological strategy, conscious or not, for the
advancement of global capital and the states allied with it. The most prominent version of this critique is
the post-Marxist account of Hardt and Negri 2002, criticized by Habermas 2006, pp. 187-188. See also
the essays by Brown 2004 and Wallach 2005, who argue that the entrenchment of rights language as
theoretically foundational is an obstacle to the realization of the highest aspirations of strong democracy
and “progressive” politics. A milder and reformist but still telling line of critique is that the doctrine of
human rights, not in essence but as sometimes currently understood, is a deceptively alluring vehicle for
the imposition of European political culture on the rest of the world. See Mutua 2002. A similarly
reformist critique of contemporary human rights doctrine is proposed in several of the essays in Bauer
and Bell 1999. Other noteworthy recent attempts aim at rescuing human rights talk from its links to
Western individualism and capitalism by reconceiving human rights on the basis of a picture of humanity
as characterized by certain basic weaknesses as well as by unique dignity. See Butler 2004 and 2010
(“There are ways of framing that will bring the human into view in its frailty and precariousness, that will
allow us to stand for the value and dignity of human life…” 2010: 77) and Meister 2011. My own
political position is in the camp of those theorists trying to re-situate rights talk rather than replace it, but
my (Aristotelian) orientation is quite different from modernist and post-modernist accounts. For an
attempt to combine Kantian agency and dignity with an Aristotelian view of human vulnerability, see
Nussbaum 2011: 127: “What makes Aristotle of continuing centrality for political thought is the way in
which he coupled an understanding of choice and its importance with an understanding of human
vulnerability.”
2
By the “West” I mean the cultural world that historically emerges from and is the secular successor to
European Christendom. Both medieval “Christendom” and the modern “West” attempt to appropriate
Plato and Aristotle for their own ends, usually treating them as venerable points of departure to be
overcome by newer and truer teachings of later theology and philosophy. My argument is that this is a
serious mistake, and that the great usefulness of Plato and Aristotle is as an open-ended challenge to
prevailing views.
3
I think Michael Rosen’s empirical claim about the meaning and significance of dignity in contemporary
world politics is accurate (2012:1-2): “Dignity is central to modern human rights discourse, the closest
that we have to an internationally accepted framework for the normative regulation of political life, and it
is embedded in numerous constitutions, international conventions, and declarations.” My critique of the
concept of dignity and the metaphysical dualism that supports it draws on two recent excellent “prodignity” books by Rosen and by George Kateb (2011). Both Kateb and Rosen stress the weight of the
Kantian understanding of dignity (Würde) in contemporary political discourse and practice, and both
stress the centrality of the element of autonomy, as opposed to natural heteronomy, in the Kantian version
of dignity. Kateb is worth quoting at length on this: “In the idea of human dignity to recognize oneself as
sharing in a common humanity with every human being is the primordial component of individual
identity. Its positive center, however, is the belief in one’s uniqueness together with the uniqueness of
every human being. Analogously, the dignity of the human species lies in its uniqueness in a world of
species. I am what no one else is, while not existentially superior to anyone else; we human beings belong
to a species that is what no other species is; it is the highest species on earth—so far. . . . Only the human
species is, in the most important existential respects, a break with nature and significantly not natural. It is
unique among species in not being only natural. Of course, if the species breaks with nature, so must
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makes sense, philosophically, to consider as an alternative to human rights talk Aristotle’s (preChristian and pre-Western) normative focus on practical reason (phronêsis), backed up
theoretically by a revised version of his idea of the possibilities and problems of human
development, those which are implicit in biologically inherited, species-specific, human nature.
As an initial clarification of the difference between the two frameworks or lenses, we
might say that Aristotle’s position is a non-reductive naturalism that rests on an analogy between
the human good the idea of physical or bodily health that underlies the practice of medicine,
although determining the human good, universally and in context, is always much more difficult
than determining physical or bodily health. The human rights framework, by contrast, rests on
the premise of the essential and uniquely human transcendence of mere animal nature, the
transcendence, in Kantian—and also Hegelian and Marxian—terms, from the Realm of
Necessity into the Realm of Freedom.4 One major advantage of the Aristotelian alternative is
that it is much more open to responses from a variety of communities than is human rights
discourse. Finally, I raise the question of whether Aristotelian naturalism, properly understood,
might even provide the starting point for a more satisfying and more inclusive philosophical
justification for the contemporary politics of universal human rights than any neo-Kantian appeal
to the all too parochial standard of human dignity.
The aim of my essay, then, is to argue that there is something wrong with the currently
dominant paradigm in international political theory, and to suggest the desirability of considering
a new and explicitly Aristotelian paradigm or framework to contest and to complement (but not
to drive out) our theoretical status quo. But first I need to say a word about terms. When we
every individual member of it” (2011:17). Kateb’s work is especially valuable because, unlike other
dignity and rights theorists, he acknowledges the character of his Kantian dualism and the problems, both
explanatory and normative, that it raises.
4
For Kant, we have two “natures”: “Nature has endowed us with two distinct abilities for two distinct
purposes, namely that of man as an animal species and that of man as a moral species.” Conjectures on
the Beginning of Human History, PW (H. Reiss ed., Nisbet trans.), 228n. I have learned much from
Velkley’s (2002) account of this dualist turn in modern Western philosophizing
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speak of “paradigms”, or “imaginaries”, or “prejudices”, or “cultures”, we seek to identify those
often unself-conscious presuppositions that define the limits of discourse within a given
community.

The problem with all these terms is that they misleadingly suggest a false

concreteness and coherence to those often changeable and overlapping collections of
presuppositions, turning an unstable aggregate of beliefs and opinions into a discoursestructuring agent, something like an Hegelian Zeitgeist. This is especially true of the word
“culture,” but it is also true of “paradigm.” So from this point on, I propose to substitute for these
totalizing terms Aristotle’s word endoxa, which refers to the prevailing opinions about
fundamental matters within a community, opinions that can be examined in terms of their
accuracy and fruitfulness as guides to understanding and acting in the world.5 I will argue that
the current NeoKantian theoretical endoxa have two serious flaws as guides of this kind: they
assume the necessity of theoretical precision as the normative core of political philosophy, and
they assume the truth of a sort of metaphysical dualism that contrasts human freedom with
natural necessity.6 My proposal for an Aristotelian alternative is intended to incorporate the
current endoxa within a broader, more open, and possibly more accurate framework for practical
philosophy; I aim at reorientation rather than wholesale replacement, at “saving” the endoxa or
“phenomena,”7 rather than replacing them. And while the basis for my proposal is my

5

The Aristotelian equivalent for “culture” or “paradigm” is the “endoxa,” the leading opinions that shape
the thought and action of a particular society. “The endoxa are opinions about how things seem that are
held by all or by the many or by the wise--that is, by all the wise, or by the many among them, or by the
most notable (gnôrimoi) and endoxic (endoxoi, most famous) of them.” Topics 100b21ff. The fact that
Aristotle identifies a belief as respected does not imply that he finds it true, or even respectable;
nevertheless, it is clear that he regards some such opinions as indispensable for both political life and
philosophic inquiry.
6
Kant, GMM, 60 (Gregor trans): “Philosophy must therefore assume that no true contradiction will be
found between freedom and natural necessity in the very same human actions, for it cannot give up the
concept of nature any more that that of freedom.”
7
When Aristotle speaks of “saving the phenomena” (as at NE 7.1, 1145b2-7), he explicitly refers to the
endoxa, and not to any perceptions or events that might underlie them. His goal is to preserve as many of
these authoritative opinions as can be preserved without endorsing serious endoxic mistakes about the
way the world is.
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interpretation of Aristotle as a non-dogmatic and non-reductionist8 naturalist, similar proposals
have been developed on independent grounds by a number of recent philosophical critics of
modern practical philosophy.9
My thesis is that the best way to make sense of the emerging modern human rights
regime is via a pre-modern theory, Aristotle’s theory of natural questions, an approach that
focuses on the problems Aristotle thinks, on the basis of his empirical understanding of human
psychology, human beings must solve in order to live choiceworthy lives.10 I will make the case
for Aristotle by contrasting the position I attribute to him with some versions of NeoKantianism
that currently prevail in the area of rights theory.
One of the most plausible and careful of them is offered by Seyla Benhabib. In Dignity
in Adversity: Human Rights in Troubled Times (2011), Benhabib seeks to articulate a discoursetheoretic justification for a plausible and effective doctrine of human rights. Her position is
Kantian, but it cannot rely on a Kantian two-world metaphysic. What then is the basis or ground
for her discourse-theoretic claims about the basic principles of human rights she wishes to
defend, namely, Habermasian communicative freedom, the right to have rights (an Arendtian
expression, but given a cosmopolitan meaning Arendt rejects), democratic iterations, and
8

Strictly speaking, it is more accurate to say that Aristotle’s naturalism is not exclusively reductionist.
For him, understanding a living organism requires two distinct accounts: one setting out the necessitating
conditions of the organism’s activity and the other providing an account of a good way of life for that
organism. The first account is reductionist, the second teleological, and neither, by itself, is sufficient for
a comprehensive understanding the organism in question.
9
Prominent examples include McDowell 1996, MacIntyre 1999, Murdoch 1993, Scott 1999, Sen 1999,
Strauss 1953, Wong 2006, and Appiah 2008. Wong’s Natural Moralities: A Defense of Pluralistic
Relativism is a good example of an Aristotelian naturalism in ethics and politics without any particular
explicit reliance on Aristotle. Wong presents his own position as “relativist,” a term I would not
associate with Aristotle’s naturalism. But the meaning Wong gives to his naturalism is perfectly
Aristotelian: “A naturalistic approach to morality . . . will support both the denial of a single true morality
and the existence of significant limits on the plurality of true moralities” (p. xiv, my italics). This is an
apt way of stating the core of an Aristotelian ethics and politics of natural questions. A similarly apt
statement, bringing out especially the plurality of human goods, is Leo Strauss’s: “There is a universally
valid hierarchy of ends, but there are no universally valid rules of action. . . . one has to consider not only
which of the various competing objectives is higher in rank but also which is most urgent in the
circumstances.” Strauss 1953: 162.
10
See Salkever 2000 and 2002.
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jurisgenerativity? Her answer is that universal human rights cannot be based on any facts about
human nature, which she would reject as “metaphysical,” but rather on a sort of experience: her
theory “presupposes the egalitarian experiences of modernity. I am not maintaining [she says],
in some Hegelian fashion, that these views are the necessary end products of the course of
history. Rather they are contestable, fraught, and fragile experiences through which the
standpoint of “generalized other,” as extending to all humanity becomes a practical possibility
but certainly not a political actuality” (69-70, my italics). She goes on to say that “[s]uch
reciprocal recognition of each other as beings who have the right to have rights involves political
struggles, social movements, and learning processes within and across classes, genders, ethnic
groups and religious faiths. Universalism does not consist in an essence or human nature that we
are all said to have or to possess, but rather in experiences of establishing commonality across
diversity, conflict, divide, and struggle. Universalism is an aspiration, a moral goal to strive for;
it is not a fact, a description of the way the world is” (70). Finally, she states what she sees as the
clear methodological superiority of her approach to justification: “Let me emphasize how this
justification of human rights through a discourse-theoretic account of communicative freedom
differs from others. In the first place, the justification of human rights is viewed as a dialogic
practice and is not mired in the metaphysics of natural rights theories” (70, my italics).
The problem is that the basis for Benhabib’s argument here is not, however, a set of
experiences, as she claims, but rather a particular and contestable interpretation of those
experiences, an interpretation different in content but similar in form and function to John
Rawls’ account of the meaning of modern Western liberal and constitutional democracy (for
example, his foundational acceptance of “the two moral powers” as historical givens), an
interpretation influenced by her Kantian philosophical lenses, lenses that highlight the emergence
over time of universal human equality and moral freedom as the central achievements of human
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history (as in Kant’s “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose”11). The lesson
here may be that if an interpretation of experience is repeated often enough it is easy to mistake
the interpretation for the experience itself. This erasure of the difference between experience and
interpretation calls to mind Yack’s 1999 diagnosis of the “fetishism of modernity.”
Whatever its shortcomings, the prevalence and power (or in McCarthy’s phrase
“discursive weight”) of NeoKantianism in contemporary human rights theory is hardly
surprising, since Kant is the theorist who most sharply outlines and argues for the emergence of a
human rights regime not unlike the one we now see around us. Nevertheless, my argument will
be that an Aristotelian approach is superior to a Kantian one in several respects: it yields a more
plausible psychological picture of what human rights claims are; it rests on a more accurate
account of what politics needs from philosophy or theory; and it is less ethnocentric and more
open to philosophical discussion with non-European traditions.
With respect to defining humanity, an Aristotelian approach would treat the
establishment of human rights standards as a potentially valuable political act designed to further
the opportunities for well-lived individual lives, rather than, as for the NeoKantian, an expression
of a commitment to an abstract (or, if not abstract, distinctly Christian or Stoic) conception of
human dignity.12 Kantian dignity attaches to human beings not because of the quality of the lives
we lead but as a result of our unique power of giving reasons and acting according to them. As
11

Mara (forthcoming) presents an excellent and fruitful juxtaposition of this essay with another Greek
theorist, Thucydides.
12
“The Kantian turn in contemporary political theory is characterized by a principled reliance on the idea
of human dignity as underpinning notions of autonomy, individual rights, and egalitarian politics.
Proponents and critics of this branch of liberal political theory view the notion of human dignity in
axiomatic terms as the modern successor of honor” (Livingston and Soroko 2007: 494). They conclude
their discussion of Kant’s reflections on the tension between positional honor and strict justice in
Metaphysics of Morals (in his argument that the state should perhaps mitigate just punishment in the case
of certain “honor killings”) by noting that Kant’s hesitation shows his awareness of the need not to apply
the norm of universal dignity in the same way in all contexts and cases: “what Kant bumps up against
here, and what he tries to systematize out of existence, is the narrowness of a strictly formal
understanding of human dignity. Dignity, while a deontic concept, also has an irreducible interpretive
element to it whereby what counts as respect or disrespect will always be, within some confines, a matter
of contextualized judgment and deliberation” (499-500).
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Charles Taylor (1994: 57) says, “Dignity is associated less with any particular understanding of
the good life, such that someone’s departure from this would detract from his or her own dignity,
than with the power to consider and espouse for oneself some view or other.” The trouble with
dignity is that it is too formal and substance-begging to stand on its own and hence too easily
filled with ideas from the existing endoxa, including endoxic interpretations of shared historical
experiences.
By contrast, Aristotle’s theoretical frame is an explicit and empirical view of human
flourishing: as such, it is open to criticism in the light of experience. At the same time (quite
intentionally on Aristotle’s part) it is never conclusive or precise enough to be stated as an
action-guiding rule or principle. Perhaps the most important difference between the Aristotelian
and Kantian frameworks discussed here is their central disagreement over how to mark the
essential difference between human beings and other creatures: Aristotle’s prohairesis and
Kant’s conception of dignity. Briefly, prohairesis is the activity that combines thinking and
feeling in a uniquely human way (NE 6, 1139b4-5), such that to be a human being is to act kata
tên prohairesin (Pol 3, 1280a31-34); but this prohairetic (or thoughtfully chosen) life can involve
acting in vicious as well as virtuous ways. For Aristotle, the fact that we are maturely and
actively thoughtful in arranging our life does not guarantee that we will do it well. All good
human lives are prohairetic, but not all prohairetic lives are good—NE 7 (1148a13-17; 1149b311150a8; 1150a16-30; 1151a5-7) makes this abundantly clear, in asserting that both virtue and
vice are prohairetic dispositions, i.e., thoughtfully chosen psychic states. This makes our lives
uniquely problematic, and requires continual thought about ways to address this difficulty.13 For
13

Jill Frank’s formulation is especially clear: “Prohairetic activity is, thus, characteristically human
activity insofar as it discloses the character, the soul, and thereby the nature of the one who acts,
specifically by revealing the degree to which, in the actions he undertakes, the actor is using the capacity
for logos he possesses by virtue of being human” (Frank 2005: 34). The Greek word prohairesis takes on
a very different and quite unAristotelian meaning—that of an unequivocally desirable and infallible
universalizing transcendence of local custom and law, something much more like a Kantian rational will,
in Epictetus (see Stephens 2007 and Sorabji 2007) and in Martin Heidegger (see Weidenfeld 2011). An
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Aristotle, there are various activities that can help us—family and political life, virtue
friendships, and the practice of philosophy14, understood as the life-long desire to discover the
causes of things—but none of these are sure things.

Concerning the relationship between

theory and practice, the Aristotelian sees philosophy’s role as that of supplying an orientation or
a set of questions for practice rather than a justification or foundational underpinning for it.
Finally, the basic terms of the Aristotelian approach, terms designed to clarify the
complexity of the problem of human happiness, are much easier to extend across cultural lines
than are the central terms of the NeoKantian rights-theoretical approach. A surprising twist to the
advantages of an Aristotelian approach, I will argue, is that it relies on an explicit and nonfoundationalist metaphysics or theory of being instead of attempting, as do NeoKantians such as
Rawls, Benhabib, and Habermas, to exclude explicit metaphysical claims from the discourse of
practical philosophy. Aristotle himself refers to this subject, which he discusses most thoroughly
in his book we call the Metaphysics (literally, the After [or Behind]–the-Natural-Sciences) as
“first philosophy.” We might also call this theorizing about being ontology, but that expression in
contemporary (often Heideggerian) philosophic usage tends to privilege the human as the central
element of being (see, for example, Butler 2010: 168, n. 2), something Aristotle’s theory of being

interesting bridge between Aristotle and Epictetus on prohairesis is the use of the term by late fourth
century Attic orators, such as Demosthenes and Aeschines, who use it to mean something like Aristotle’s
term hexis, that relatively stable ethical attitude toward the world that is a mature individual’s moral
virtue or moral vice. For discussion of Aristotle’s and the orators use of prohairesis, see Allen 2006,
though her discussion of Aristotle’s prohairesis focuses on the Rhetoric, and treats the orators usage as
closer to Aristotle’s than I think it is, at least if we consider Aristotle’s use of prohairesis in the NE.
14
Aristotle uses the term “philosophy” in an interesting variety of ways, but the two main ones are these:
“first philosophy,” the steady focus on the unchanging things described in NE 10 and Politics 7; and the
drive to know not only “what is” (to ti) but also the “cause of what is” (to dia ti) (Eudemian Ethics 1,
1216b-1217a). This latter notion of a philosophic life is much less rarified (and much more Platonic) than
the life of theôria depicted in Pol 7 and NE 10. The EE 1 passage implies that the philosophic drive for
causal knowledge can be applied to any sort of object we want to understand—politics, or education, or
biology, or music and art generally.
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explicitly rejects. I prefer “metaphysical”15 simply because most of the contemporary
philosophizing about rights that I criticize in this paper takes for granted that it is a very good
thing for political theory or philosophy to be post-metaphysical. I deny this; simply put, my
claim is that we inevitably presuppose one or another theory of being whenever we theorize
about anything (or any being), and that we are better off when we become aware and self-critical
of the theory of being that animates our political theorizing. Metaphysics understood in the
Aristotelian way helps open discussion of political principles, by bringing out the issue of what
any political practice or practical philosophy implies and presupposes about the character of
human being in itself and in relation to other beings. Eliminating metaphysics tends too often to
turn the problem of human development into a dogmatic assertion about the uniquely
transcendent quality of human being.
To be sure, Kant does not claim to know that human progress toward rational perfection
is necessary or even possible,16 and thus he stops short of asserting the eventual union of the real
and the ideal and of the universal and the individual (Hegel and Marx do not stop short of this),
but he does nevertheless believe there is substantial empirical evidence that such progress is
actually occurring, especially in Europe. He also thinks that the loss of faith in such progress
would be reason for unbearable sadness about humanity.17 This view is shared by Nietzsche:
without hope in the possibility of the overman, a figure who surpasses humanity as a self-

15

For an accessible and illuminating discussion of what to call Aristotle’s theorizing about being(s) in the
Metaphysics, see Aryeh Kosman (2013), Chapter 1. Kosman, for good Aristotelian reasons of his own,
prefers the term “ontology.”
16
Thomas McCarthy’s admirably precise formulation of Kant’s project is especially useful in
emphasizing its dualism: “The bridge between nature and freedom is, then, human history, in which raw
human nature is gradually cultivated to the point at which the realization of a moral world in
nature/history becomes not a certainty but a rational hope” (2009: 55).
17
“For what is the use of lauding and holding up for contemplation the glory and wisdom of creation in
the non-rational sphere of nature, if the history of mankind, the very part of this great display of supreme
wisdom which contains the purpose of all the rest, is to remain a constant reproach to everything else?
Such a spectacle would force us to turn away in revulsion, and, by making us despair of ever finding any
completed rational aim behind it, would reduce us only to hoping for it in some other world.” “Idea for A
Universal History,” in Reiss, ed., Kant: Political Writings, p. 53.
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generating creative force, human life ceases to be worth living. Without the possibility of any
such this-worldly redemption for humanity, Kant believes, nothing is left but revulsion and
despair about the human prospect. If Progress is dead, secular practical philosophy loses much of
its reason for being.18 For Kant, philosophy transcends religion and is thus not dependent on any
special revelation, but nonetheless it is no surprise to him that the best philosophy comes from
Christian lands, since he is convinced that Christianity prepares the way for true philosophy, by
surpassing in purity and clarity the moral precepts of other religions.19
Metaphysics: Aristotelian Pluralism and Kantian Dualism
I have stressed the extent to which the Kantian and NeoKantian approaches derive from
Protestant Christian religious beliefs. My intention in dwelling on this is not to discredit their
claims to universality thereby; every universal claim begins from some particular endoxic
context, and there is no universal and neutral place to begin our thoughts about universals. My
point is rather that by not taking their Christian origins seriously and critically enough,
NeoKantians tend to overlook three central premises of their orientation: 1) The belief that nature
is a system of externally caused motion, a system in which no action is free or self-caused; 2)
The belief that human beings are the sole beings who can escape from the realm of nature into a
realm of morality and autonomy, a possibility that uniquely entitles us to dignity and respect; and
3) The belief that history is not a random collection of events, but at least potentially a narrative
of irreversible progress, not of individuals but of the human species as a whole, from the
dependence of the realm of nature to the freedom embodied in the realm of morals and politics.
These three propositions—that nature is a closed system of matter in law-like motion, that

18

Nussbaum (1997:42-43) believes that Kant’s dignity-based cosmopolitanism is separable from his
tentative hope for transcendental progress. I disagree, but the question is surely an open one.
19
“A greater treatment of moral ideas—which was made necessary by the extremely pure moral law of
our religion—sharpened reason for dealing with this [divine] object, through the interest that this
treatment compelled people to take in this object.” Critique of Pure Reason, Part 2, Section 2 (Hackett;
Pluhar trans.), p. 745.
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human beings are the beings uniquely able to escape this system and become free and creative,
and that human history, culminating in the unique experience of modernity or postmodernity20, is
the record of this progress from animal slavery to human independence—form the unexamined
metaphysical foundation for the NeoKantian rights theorist. The problem is not that the
propositions are metaphysical claims about the character of being, since some such claims are
inevitable once we begin to think universally about practical questions. Making metaphysical
claims is something I think we do and have to do from the moment we refuse to accept as
beyond criticism the stories told about action by our particular laws and conventions. The
problem is, rather, that the metaphysical premises of NeoKantian practical philosophy remain
systematically unexamined, as if there were no plausible and available alternatives to them. What
if they happen to be false and misleading?
Good contemporary theory needs to keep that question open, and the only way it can do
so is by appealing to a political philosophy distinct from its Kantian roots. That is, I contend,

20

For the leading NeoKantian rights theorists, such as Rawls, Habermas, and Benhabib, the experience of
modernity—or, rather, their interpretation of that experience--is all the theoretical basis we need.
McCarthy is particularly clear about this. McCarthy (2009: 222-223; italics in text) rejects the plausibility
of any inquiry that goes beyond the conceptual and discursive limits imposed by the endoxic
presuppositions of Western modernity. He argues that political philosophy must rule out preEnlightenment pictures of the world, not because they are false, but “because they have lost and continue
to lose their discursive weight.” As for postmodernism, he says this: “To begin with, the reflexivity of
modern cultures has meant that modernization has been accompanied from the start by critiques of
modernization. Romanticism and Marxism, Nietzsche and Weber, Gandhi and Fanon, are as integral to
the discourse of modernity as the dominant ideologies they opposed. Precisely the claimed universality of
that discourse leaves it semantically and pragmatically open to dissent and criticism from subordinated
and excluded others. For this reason, modernity need not—indeed cannot—be left behind for some
putative postmodernity; but it can be continually transformed from within. In the present connection, it is
significant that the late twentieth century saw the rise of a global discourse of modernity in which
postcolonial thinkers have played an increasingly important, critical and transformative role.” He goes on
to say that “there is little chance of radically different modernities arising and surviving in the world we
live in. On the other hand, there is not only the possibility but also the reality of multiple
modernities”(223). See Taylor (2004) on the possibility of “multiple modernities,” but see also Yack
(2005), arguing that Taylor’s “multiple modernities seem like little more than local variations on a single
pattern.”
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where Aristotle (and not NeoAristotelianism,21 and, a fortiori, not “virtue ethics”22) comes in.
For Aristotle (on my understanding): 1) “Nature” is a collection23 of many kinds of “natures,”
and each of the various natural kinds must be understood in terms of the end or telos that is
internal and specific to it, as well as in terms of the law-like forces that share in determining the
life of each individual natural being.24 2) All individual members of living species, including
plants as well as animals, are to some degree self-moving, and not simply matter in law-like
motion. The implication of this is that human beings, in our freedom, do not transcend animality,
but only extend and develop features that are present in other living things (though not in the
non-living elements from which all organisms are composed). There is no scientific basis for
asserting a qualitative difference between humans and other mortals, and hence no basis for a
claim of special human dignity.25 As opposed to Aristotle, for Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Marx, and
even Nietzsche, human beings are the uniquely “perfectible” beings. For Aristotle, humans are
unique among animals in our capacity for bringing about great good and great harm to ourselves
(Politics 1.2). This means that we are the uniquely problematic animals, in several ways the most
complex and interesting, but our complexity and diversity gives us no special title to dignity or
21

My position is Aristotelian rather than NeoAristotelian because I adopt, provisionally (and Aristotle
seems to me to be as explicitly provisional about the status of his own metaphysical claims as Plato),
Aristotle’s metaphysical background for Aristotelian practical philosophy.
22
See Nussbaum’s (1999) critique of contemporary virtue ethics.
23
That is, nature is not, for Aristotle an all-embracing Being from which we can take our bearings in the
world. His pluralist metaphysics is, I believe, shared by Plato, who is committed, provisionally, in Paul
Stern’s apt phrase, to “the irreducibly heterogeneous nature of things” (2008: 40, n.21). But this
metaphysical pluralism is not by any means a principle generally adopted by “the ancients”—on this
point, Plato and Aristotle are sharply opposed to Heraclitus and Parmenides, as well as to Epictetus and to
Stoicism generally. Strauss (1953:122) identifies such metaphysical pluralism as “Socratic,” holding it is
found in both Plato’s and Xenophon’s Socrates: “Socrates deviated from his predecessors by identifying
the science of the whole, or of everything that is, with the understanding of ‘what each of the beings is.”
24
Or, at any rate, of each sublunary natural being. Celestial beings, for Aristotle, live and move according
to different principles, although the same idea of causation applies in both the sublunary and celestial
worlds. For discussion, see Andrea Falcon 2005.
25
This interpretation of Aristotle is argued for by Sorabji 1993, and by Osborne 2007, especially chs. 4
and 5. For the mainstream of modern philosophy from Hobbes and Descartes through Kant, Hegel, and
beyond, animals are machines. The question that remains is whether humans are animals and hence also
machines (as for Hobbes), or transcend mere animality and hence are not machines (as for Kant and
Hegel). Aristotle’s empirical and provisional metaphysics rejects both options, holding that humans are
one particularly complex variety of animal.
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respect.26 3) The history of human life is not and cannot be a narrative of human progress toward
freedom and reason. Nor is there any Golden Age in the past. On the whole, Aristotle clearly
believes that human beings are better off in his time than they were in the remote past. But the
human problem, the problem of how to live a good life given our various biologically inherited
drives and social contexts, is one that must be solved in different ways by and for each individual
and group of individuals. The future cannot redeem us.
Aristotle connects his metaphysical reflections to questions of ethics and politics via the
following empirical question: In what way are human beings distinct from other living beings,
from other teleologically organized natural wholes or kinds? The answer to this question does
not yield natural laws, either causal (in the modern “Humean” sense of causality) or normative.
Instead, it points out the problems that we, as human beings, typically have to solve in order to
live successful (or eudaimonic) human lives. The notion of a “successful” life (or a good life) is
not uniquely applicable to humans, since it only continues the idea that holds true for every
living species: what a living thing is is in part revealed by the distinction between a healthy and
an unhealthy, a successful and an unsuccessful life for that species.
Humans are, for Aristotle, the uniquely problematic animal. This is not at all the same as
saying we are the uniquely self-creating or “as yet indeterminate” (noch nicht festgestellte) or
incomplete (p, BGE 62) animals.

What “problematic” means from an Aristotelian perspective

is that we typically and uniquely experience a variety of biologically inherited motives and
desires or drives, sometimes clashing, in ways that can at least partially be explained by
evolution and natural selection. Among these biologically inherited motives and drives are
pleonexia (or the boundless desire for instrumental goods), kin preference, group or culture

26

See David Wong’s (2011) critique of Rawls on “the Aristotelian principle.”
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preference, pseudospeciation,27 the desire for honor and for what Appadurai (2006) calls a
“predatory identity,” and a desire to understand ourselves and the cosmos around us
(Metaphysics, first sentence). These are all potentials for desiring and acting that need to be
developed, repressed, and coordinated in the context of each particular life—something that is
less true for other animals, and not at all true for more perfect and simple beings like fixed stars
and unmoved movers. Far from prescribing rules for living the good life, Aristotle insists that
there is no one single answer to the question of what is the best life or the best regime for every
individual and every community.28 I have developed this framework with reference to Aristotle,
but the position itself can be developed without relying on Aristotle or any other Greek
philosopher. At its core, Aristotle’s position here is an attempt to avoid two mistaken beliefs. The
first is the idea that practical judgments about what is good for individuals or for political
communities in particular contexts can be deduced from theoretical principles, principles that are
either descriptive of human nature or in some way self-evident. Principles like his claim that we
are political animals or that we need friends to live well are not meant to be taken as selfevidently true, but make sense only in the light of his teleologically causal account of the human
need to develop our capacity for living a good or virtuous prohairetic life. Such a life is the
human good, but that good cannot serve as a self-evident principle because the Aristotelian
theoretical account of this natural human good is both intentionally imprecise and so variegated
that it cannot be expressed as a single coherent rule or model. The second mistake, in a way the
opposite of the first, is to hold that our practical judgments cannot be criticized in terms of
universal standards. Aristotle’s third way here is that the guidance theory gives to practice

27

Pseudospeciation: Erik Erikson’s term for the false belief that human beings who are very different
from us must not be human at all; this belief, though false, seems to be one to which we humans are
pervasively susceptible.
28
This is the argument he makes in NE V.7, 1134b-1135a: “With us humans, though presumably not with
the gods, what is best by nature varies from place to place; still, for each human being and for each place,
there is one way of life and one regime that is best by nature and not only by convention.”
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consists in supplying a question or a mode of problematization rather than either a rule or no help
at all: What is the naturally best human solution possible under the circumstances, the judgment
that embodies the best possible balance of human goods and so best serves the cause of the
prohairetic life? In effect, this is the Aristotelian candidate for avoiding the horns of Bernstein’s
bad relativism versus abstract universalism dilemma, the Aristotelian metaphysical ground for
ethics and politics.29

Evaluating the Two Frameworks
Let me summarize briefly the difficulties, as I see them, with the modern Western (and
increasingly global) theoretical endoxa. They involve the implicit and unexamined acceptance of
the following presuppositions and habits of mind:
1) It treats nature in a narrowly constricted way. Kant tells us that the realm of nature is the great
antithesis to the realm of rational autonomy and human dignity. For him, nature is a “heteronomy
of efficient causality” (GMM, Ak. 4:446; Gregor trans. 52)—there is neither agency, nor ends or
norms to be found in nature, and hence the necessity of discovering some conceptual or
existential place distinct from nature for human beings to exercise and exhibit our characteristic
autonomy and agency. Kant’s reasons for describing nature in this way are not accepted by
NeoKantian theory, but that view of nature is implicit in contemporary rights talk.

29

Richard Bernstein (2006) argues that Aristotle’s often repeated but rarely understood warning against
demanding excessive precision in practical philosophy is useful as a cure for the modern tendency to
embrace either an excessively abstract universalism or a relativism that presents itself as the only
alternative to a caricature of abstract universalist foundationalism. Aristotle’s non-dogmatic naturalism,
but contrast, by contrast, is similar to that of Wong 2006, McDowell 1996, MacIntyre 1999, and Iris
Murdoch: “I offer frankly a sketch of metaphysical theory, a kind of inconclusive non-dogmatic
naturalism, which has the circularity of definition characteristic of such theories. . . In any case, the sketch
which I have offered, a footnote in a great and familiar philosophical tradition, must be judged by its
power to connect, to illuminate, to explain, and to make new and fruitful places for reflection” (1970: 4445). The non-dogmatic naturalist tradition with which Murdoch identifies is the one articulated most
clearly, for her, by Plato. (For a similar view, see Stern on McDowell’s “naturalized Platonism” [2008:
209,n.33].) Murdoch opposes her own self-described Platonic tradition to the one that animates Western
post-Kantian moral philosophy, whether, in her terms, existentialist or British analytic.
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2) As a result, human rights theory treats humans as the uniquely transcendent animals. Human
beings are the only creatures capable of transcending the otherwise “heteronomous” realm of
nature thus understood. We alone are singular, autonomous, and creative beings. We are thus
uniquely entitled to equal rights or to dignity and moral worth.
3) Since our transcendence is understood as an emergent phenomenon, progressive history is
taken to be a necessary element of a meaningful human life. Human history is a coherent and
essentially progressive narrative.
perfection is a plausible outcome.

The future will redeem the suffering of the past. A kind of
Or, at the very least, if there is no such thing as progress or

the possibility of progress, either toward autonomy (Kant, Hegel, Marx) or toward the reduction
of suffering (Mill), individual human life may well turn out to be meaningless. The belief in
human dignity gives us an ideal to strive for and live up to, rather than a problem to solve (as
with Aristotle’s phronêsis and prohairesis). It is not impossible to think of dignity as an inspiring
end in itself, independent of any controversial metaphysical or religious foundation. By itself it
might provide the basis for a kind of global civil religion.30 But is that advantage itself a
problem: by embracing the idea of progress, does modern Western philosophy abandon the
pursuit of truth as its fundamental reason for being?
4) As for method, the belief that all rational philosophic discourse must be systematic.31 And one
element of systematicity is that it must aim at certainty and finality. The goal should be to aim at

30

See George Washington’s “Farewell Address” on the need for simple and transcendent religious ideals
to inspire civility, even if those ideals have no clear ground in nature as we experience it.
31
Charles Taylor (1989: 76-77) calls this “a tendency to breathtaking systematization in modern moral
philosophy. Utilitarianism and Kantianism organize everything around one basic reason. And as so often
happens in such cases the notion becomes accredited among proponents of these theories that the nature
of moral reasoning is such that we ought to be able to unify our moral views around a single base. John
Rawls, following J.S. Mill, rejects what he describes as the “intuitionist” view, which is precisely a view
that allows for a plurality of such basic criteria. But to see how far this is from being an essential feature
of moral thinking we have only to look at Aristotle’s ethical theory. Aristotle sees us pursuing a number
of goods, and our conduct as exhibiting a number of different virtues. We can speak of a single “complete
good” (teleion agathon) because our condition is such that the disparate goods we seek have to be
coherently combined in a single life, and in their right proportions. But the good life as a whole doesn’t
stand to the partial goods as a basic reason.”
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answering questions, once and for all, rather than provoking further inquiry. This is as true for
Kant as it is for Hobbes: “[A]nyone who announces a system of philosophy as his own work says
in effect that before this philosophy there was none at all. For if he were willing to admit that
there had been another (and a true one), there would then be two different and true philosophies
on the same subject, which is self-contradictory” (Metaphysic of Morals, Part I, Preface).
5) In ethics and politics, the belief that equal freedom is the fundamental human desideratum, the
elevation of freedom to the status of ultimate value, and the rejection of the possibility of any
plausible claim about universal human goods.32 We should contrast this with the Aristotelian
view of freedom as one human good among several, and his stress on developing human virtues
rather than achieving freedom. Note that this does not imply that Aristotle should be treated as a
modern virtue ethicist, since his focus is on how to think about human goods, human flourishing,
and human psychological development, and not on how we should act in particular contexts: that
should, for him, be the work of phronêsis rather than any theory, his own included.
6) The inclination to view the state as the major threat to human rights, and the concomitant
underestimation of the extent to which private individuals and entities threaten human rights in
ways that the state has a duty to prevent and remedy. West 2011 makes a similar critique of
modern conceptions of the reasons for insisting on the rule of law. See Ignatieff 2001 on the
modern state as both the major enemy to human rights and the major support for human rights.
7) The presence of a residual Christianity in modern rights talk. There is a tendency among
NeoKantian rights theorists, including Rawls, Benhabib, and Habermas, to treat the modern
vocabulary of human rights as a secularization of a moral doctrine that emerged first as an
element of Protestant Christianity. This belief limits the possibility of conversation outside of

32

Taylor is also helpful here (1989: 489): “The very claim not to be oriented by a notion of the good is
one which seems to me to be incredible, for reasons outlined in the first part of this book. But it also
reflects that the underlying ideal is some variant of that most invisible, because it is the most pervasive, of
all modern goods, unconstrained freedom.”
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what was once Christendom—all other sets of endoxa have to scramble to come up with
equivalents for Christian or post-Christian dignity.
To be sure, there are at least three major objections that the Aristotelian approach I favor
must contend with: 1) That Aristotle’s metaphysics rests on a discredited or simply mistaken
theory of being; 2) That Aristotle’s metaphysics is essentially undemocratic in its implications;
and 3) That Aristotelian theorizing cannot respond to the distinctly modern events and
experiences that shape the human world as we know it. My argument is that the first two
objections are misleading, while the third is valid and important, but does not lessen the need for
Aristotelian theorizing as one element of our approach to understanding the world. I will take up
this third objection in the last section of the paper, “Aristotle Or Kant?,” where I argue against
the idea that we somehow must choose between Aristotle and Kant as guides to practical reason
and political choice.
How accurate as a theory of being is Aristotle’s metaphysical account? Does it rely on an
inaccurate and outmoded view of the cosmos?33 Leo Strauss, while speaking of Socrates, gives a
capsule summary of what I take to be the skeptical (that is, framed for the purpose of generating
inquiry) rather than dogmatic character of Aristotle’s metaphysics:
“Socrates was so far from being committed to a specific cosmology that his knowledge
was knowledge of ignorance. Knowledge of ignorance is not ignorance. It is knowledge
of the elusive character of truth, of the whole. Socrates, then, viewed man in the light of
the mysterious character of the whole. He held therefore that we are more familiar with
the situation of man than with the ultimate causes of that situation. We may also say he
viewed man in he light of the unchangeable ideas, i.e., of the fundamental and permanent
problems” (Strauss 1959:38-39; see also my 1990: 46-53).
33

I argue for this way of understanding Aristotle’s metaphysics in Finding the Mean, 46-53. See
MacIntyre’s initial rejection of Aristotle’s biology in After Virtue as “metaphysical” (in a pejorative
sense) and his later emphatic correction of that rejection in Rational Dependent Animals: “In After Virtue
I had attempted to give an account of the place of the virtues, understood as Aristotle had understood
them . . . while making that account independent of what I called Aristotle’s ‘metaphysical biology.’
Although there is indeed good reason to repudiate important elements in Aristotle’s biology, I now judge
that I was in error in supposing an ethics independent of biology to be possible” (1999: x). He now asserts
that Aristotle matters to ethics “because no philosopher has taken human animality more seriously”
(1999: 5).
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Because Aristotelian metaphysics is both provisional and explicit, it is less dependent on
parochial assumptions about human transcendence and is for that reason more accessible and
hence more open to revision and interpretation from the perspective of a variety of cultures and
traditions than is a Kantian one. For Kant, what is presupposed can be summed up in his image
of the starry heavens above us (the system of natural necessity) and the moral law within us (the
system of rational freedom) (Critique of Practical Reason, “Conclusion”). In each case the
existence of law or laws as an essential element of the basic structure of reality and of human
action is taken for granted--nature is matter in law-like motion, a “heteronomy of efficient
causality”; freedom or autonomy is obedience to a law you give yourself. By contrast, the
Aristotelian premises could be stated in this way: a) There is an element of order in the
cosmos—in Aristotle this takes the form of the admittedly empirical and unprovable premise that
beings in our world are grouped into natures or species (Physics 2.1, 192b32-193a9), and b) The
similarly empirical and unprovable (knowable only as a criticizable inference from experience)
premise that there is a significant difference between well and badly lived human lives—that
there is something in the world that corresponds to Aristotle’s Greek term eudaimonia.
Aristotle’s framework concludes not with doctrines but with questions, descriptive and
normative, that cannot be answered universally and absolutely—what is human being, what is a
well-lived human life?
Thomas Nagel has recently argued that the most plausible metaphysic now is a form of
teleological naturalism that rejects both materialist reductionism and reliance on a creator god to
explain the cosmos:
“According to the hypothesis of natural teleology, the natural world would have a
propensity to give rise to beings of the kind that have a good—beings for which things
can be good or bad. These are all the actual and possible forms of life. They have
appeared through the historical process of evolution, but part of the explanation for the
existence of that process and of the possibilities on which natural selection operates
would be that they bring value into the world, in a great variety of forms” (Nagel 2013:
121, my italics).
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This is in effect Aristotle’s account of a cosmos characterized by living (“beings of the kind that
have a good”) as well as and as distinct from non-living things, where life is marked by the
presence of good and bad for each species or kind of being. Nagel goes on to note that such a
teleology does not at all assert that there is an overriding tendency to the emergence of a singular
good that perfects the cosmos as a whole. “Rather,” he continues, “it would have to be a
tendency to the proliferation of complex forms and the generation of multiple variations in the
range of possible complex systems” (122). Nagel notes the plainly Aristotelian character of his
view of the best available understanding of the cosmos, and the extent to which it requires a
revision in our understanding of the meaning and adequacy of modern natural science: “This is a
throwback to the Aristotelian conception of nature, banished from the scene at the birth of
modern science” (66). This is not to say that an Aristotelian metaphysic must reject modern
science as false; instead, the Aristotelian sees modern science as incomplete in its explanatory
power when it comes to living beings and in need of teleological supplement to understand the
way objective good and bad and better and worse operate in the lives of different biological
species, human beings very much included. From a political and psychological perspective, the
great advantage of such a conception of nature is that it licenses us to ask questions about the
healthy (and not) development of every species and of every member of each species without
reaching, in a Kantian or NeoKantian way, for a separate non-natural realm of morality and
freedom.
But we want our metaphysic to be accurate as well as useful. Can we be certain of the
truth of Aristotelian teleology? The Aristotelian answer is that we cannot—for human beings,
metaphysical questions have to remain open. The best we can do is to recognize this, and to
consider the plausibility as well as the usefulness of different metaphysical conceptions.
Speaking of the accuracy of the developmental focus of Aristotle’s teleology, Nagel says this:
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“A naturalistic teleology would mean that organizational and developmental principles of
this kind are an irreducible part of the natural order, and not the result of intentional or
purposive influence by anyone [that is, not by a providential deity or by value-creating
humanity]. I am not confident that this Aristotelian idea of teleology without intention
makes sense, but I do not at the moment see why it doesn’t” (93).
I agree that this is indeed the best we can say about the truth of Aristotle’s underlying theory of
being, but it is surely enough to convince us to take that theory seriously.
If this is the case, it becomes important to see that the Kantian premises can be
encompassed by the Aristotelian framework, as plausible yet criticizable solutions to Aristotle’s
fundamental questions, but not vice versa. Moreover, Aristotelian eudaimonism opens the
possibility of inter-cultural conversation in a way that a dualistic Kantian blend of a modern
scientific reductionist orientation to nature and a post-Christian deontology does not. For
example, several recent commentators have argued that the Confucian sense of human
excellence and the ways to achieve it are intelligible in Aristotelian terms, in spite of clear and
interesting substantive differences. This does not at all mean that Aristotle and Confucius are
saying the same thing, but that it is possible for us to construct a fruitful dialogue between them,
one that opens up new questions for our own theoretical reflections. May Sim’s Remastering
Morals with Aristotle and Confucius (2007) is an excellent example of this.34 David Wong
suggests a reason why Aristotle in his pre-Western way provides a better bridge to non-Western
philosophy (at least in the case of China) than does contemporary NeoKantian moral and
political philosophy. Wong comments on some shared features of Aristotelian thought and
ancient Chinese thought, pointing out the opposition of both ancient approaches to that of
philosophical Western modernity: “The question of how one ought to live has occupied the
center of the Greek and Chinese philosophical traditions. Modern philosophy, and most
especially contemporary philosophy, has largely remained silent on what is arguably the first
question of philosophy and has focused on the narrower question of what one morally ought to
34

See also Yu 2007.
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do or what are morally right actions” (Wong 2011: 259). The sheer narrowness of the modern
theoretical endoxa produces the appearance of accuracy, borrowed from its modern scientific and
modern Christian origins, while at the same time making it less likely that this appearance of
accuracy will be open to challenge from the thought of other places and times.35
But is Aristotle’s metaphysical and psychological framework essentially anti-democratic,
given that it does not affirm equal dignity or agency? Aristotle is not a democrat; does this make
him an elitist or aristocratist?

Perhaps not, perhaps he is an anti-anti-democrat, as Plato, given

his harsh critique of oligarchy and of lives devoted to the pursuit of either money or honor seems
to be. How might this be so?
Aristotle’s Politics makes it clear that he does not believe all regimes that are accurately
and legitimately designated democracies are just. Nonetheless, he might believe, and his
discussion of the relative merits of democracies and other regimes in the Politics certainly opens
the possibility that, all just regimes are in some sense democracies, except in cases in which
someone or some group is so superior as to merit exclusive title to rule—a situation Aristotle
clearly finds more interesting as a theoretical problem than a practical possibility.36 This position
does not flow from or commit one to either uncritical celebration of or contempt for democracy,
or for ordinary people. It does recognize that democracy, like all regimes, has characteristic
tendencies to injustice, variously diagnosed as majority tyranny by Madison, Tocqueville, and
J.S. Mill, and as a tendency to “predatory” identity politics by Arjun Appadurai. The problem for
each democracy, from an Aristotelian point of view, is that of finding ways to educate citizens
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A Thomas Kuhnian moment?
“Many of those who want to craft aristocratic regimes as well [as polities] thoroughly err not only by
the fact that they give more to the rich (euporoi), but also by misleading the people (dêmos). For
necessarily, over time, from things falsely good there must result a true evil (kakon), and the
aggrandizements (pleonexiai) of the wealthy (plousioi) are more ruinous to the regime (politeia) than
those of the people (dêmos)” (Politics 4.12, 1297a7-13). For an opposed view of the significance of this
passage, cf. Pangle (2013: 192), who suggests that Aristotle is speaking “acerbically” when he says that
the pleonexia of the wealthy is more ruinous of polity (politeia) than the pleonexia of the poor.
36
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away from such tendencies, not through direct and illiberal indoctrination but through
institutional arrangements and practices that counter democracy’s own worst tendencies.
I think Aristotle’s (and Plato’s) view of the central and unique virtue of democracy
resonates well with this 1858 statement attributed to Abraham Lincoln: “As I would not be a
slave, so I would not be a master. This expresses my idea of democracy. Whatever differs from
this, to the extent of the difference, is no democracy” (Fehrenbacher 1989: 484). This striking
formulation draws attention away from treating freedom as a good in itself and toward the need
to reflect on what uses we should make of the leisure freedom provides us, whenever we are
lucky enough to obtain it. The problem with anti-democratic oligarchs or aristocrats is that they
entertain strong hopes of becoming, in effect, despotic and dynastic masters, if masters by
consent rather than compulsion. They have no doubt that their claim to authority has more merit
than that of the democratic mob.37 Democrats, like all human beings, also wish to avoid slavery
and desire mastery, but their desire for mastery is much easier to deflect because they recognize
the need to work with others in order to achieve both freedom and a choiceworthy life. It is much
more difficult to dissuade those who are wholly committed to the rule of the “few best” and
equally to the idea that they themselves are the only conceivable aristocrats or “gentlemen.”38
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For recent discussions of Aristotle on the relative merits of oligarchy and democracy, see Jill Frank,
Democracy of Distinction, and two essays in Tabachnick and Koivukoski, edd. 2011): Steven Skultety,
“The Threat of Misguided Elites,” and Leah Bradshaw, “Oligarchs and Democrats”. On this and in
general, my reading of Aristotle in this paper is indebted to Frank and to Collins 2006.
38
I would also argue that the Kantian commitment to human dignity and to an international human rights
regime resting on it is often animated, to a degree, by a fear of democratic majority tyranny rather than
oligarchic despotism. Something like this fear of the inevitably illiberal tendency of democratic politics is
discernible in both Kant and J. S. Mill. Robin West makes a similar point about the modern commitment
to ”the rule of law,” a norm that, in practice and perhaps also in original intention, focuses attention on
threats to the individual arising from the power of the sovereign (democratic) state, rather than seeing the
function of law as “quintessentially the solution to the problem of private power.” The latter idea of law,
which West endorses, seems close to Aristotle’s view of the proper work of nomos in human life. West
2011: 45.
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Aristotle’s view of the kaloikagathoi is much less favorable than the view people who are called
such have of themselves.39
Conclusion: Kant Or Aristotle?
In After Virtue (1984), Alasdair MacIntyre argued that we face a fundamental choice
between an Aristotelian ethics of the virtues, and Nietzschean nihilism. But in the years since
then Kant has advanced and Nietzsche receded. What, then, about the need to choose between
Aristotle and Kant?
1) Choosing between the two requires us to specify what the goal of political philosophy is. If
political philosophy’s role is to systematize the endoxa, to reshape scattered reputable opinions
into a whole with integrity of its own, to establish what is essential in the political imaginary of
our age, then we must choose Kant. Aristotle is too distant from us and too intentionally
imprecise to be of much use in this project. But if the goal of political philosophizing is to
problematize the endoxa whose authority we too easily take for granted, and to supply a
language in which prevailing opinions can be continuously examined and “saved” or rejected
relative to universal norms, then we must choose Aristotle. Kant is much too close to us.
2) But why should we have to choose between either philosophers or conceptions of political
philosophy? Why not say instead that political philosophy needs to undertake both of these
projects, to tease out the potential for systematicity and integrity within the endoxa and to subject
the endoxa to fundamental critique. The well-lived life, as Plato’s Socrates asserts, requires both
commitment to a particular way of life and the capacity to examine and challenge that
commitment. Appiah applies this thought to the question of universal human rights in a distinctly
Aristotelian way: “I want to defend the utility of [universal] human rights as practical
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This is the standard Greek term for members of the upper class. Aristotle addresses the proper meaning
of this term directly only in EE 8, where he argues, utterly counter-culturally, that the truly beautiful-andgood person will be mainly devoted to first philosophy or contemplation (theôria) of the unmoved mover
(1249a-b).
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instruments for serving human purposes, for that way we can gather, I believe, a greater
consensus behind them; I am open to group legal rights—both membership and collective—but
only as instruments in the service of enriching the lives and the possibilities of individuals”
(Appiah 2001: 115). One can go farther than this in affirming the practical necessity, under the
conditions present in practically all modern states, not only Western ones, of affirming the need
for an international human rights regime, one that gives particular importance to individual rights
against the state and against concentrations of private power. But this practical commitment does
not imply the need to adopt as unquestionably true the metaphysical dualism, or the idea of
human nature and unique human dignity, that helped bring that idea of human rights into
historical actuality.40 What it does imply is the value of taking both Aristotle and Kant seriously
and skeptically41 as guides to interpreting our own personal and political experience.
By constructing for ourselves an ongoing and unending dialogue over fundamental
political questions, including questions of human development, among Kant and Aristotle and
Kongzi and Zhuangzi and Nietzsche and on and on, we are most likely to find a way into the
kind of metaphysical inquiry that I suggest is essential to a more thoughtful and more rigorous
40

For an argument along these lines, see Alasdair MacIntyre (2004). MacIntyre argues that it is a mistake
to attempt to spell out a Confucian foundation for a universal human rights regime, because individual
rights as we know and need them were developed in the West in response to three interrelated threats
posed first by early modern European states: the massive and unprecedented concentration of
technological and military power in the hands of the state; the overriding concern with adjusting
conflicting economic and social interests; and “administrative rules and regulations whose complexity
requires an expertise that is denied to most ordinary citizens” (216). He suggests that the Confucian
tradition (and, presumably, others as well) would be best served by recognizing that we now live in a
world calling for strong rights-based limits on “government and other bureaucracies,” and attempting to
make a place for dual identity as citizens of a modern state and members of Confucian or other partial
communities: “Modern political societies cannot be communities, whether Confucian or of some other
kind.” While I find this persuasive, my argument is not for the establishment of MacIntyrish nonsovereign “Aristotelian” communities within the boundaries of a modern bureaucratic state. What I
propose here is not some new sectarian tradition, but better theoretical education, one that finds its home
not in any communal tradition but in the improved dialogic practice of liberal education in American
colleges and universities.
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“Skeptical” in the Greek rather than one of the modern senses, not as a synonym for relativism or
nihilism, nor as Cartesian preparation for a future enlightened dogmatism, but as a refusal to accept any
verbal formulation, however persuasive and valuable, as putting an end to our permanent need for further
inquiry and dialogue about natural questions, that is, about the questions or problems we inherit
biologically as human beings.
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study of global political practices and institutions. Starting with Aristotle’s (as well as Plato’s)
metaphysics is essential here not because it provides a concrete foundation for deducing
psychological and political truths, but precisely because it refuses to provide such a foundation.
In style and content, but especially in style, Aristotle’s metaphysics is explicitly provisional,
dialogic, and open to possible doubts and objections in a way that Kant’s—or any modern
Western theory of being—is not. My point is not that Aristotle supplies us with a better guide to
action than Kant and the NeoKantians. Kant is closer to us and so more directly useful in
deliberating about policy options in contemporary world politics. We need Aristotle as a guide to
the less pressing but more fundamental questions of how to think about what we are doing and
who we are.
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